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Abstract. Wireless sensor networks increasingly become viable solu-
tions to many challenging problems and will successively be deployed in
many areas in the future. However, deploying new technology without
security in mind has often proved to be unreasonably dangerous. We
propose a security architecture for self-organizing mobile wireless sensor
networks that prevents many attacks these networks are exposed to. Fur-
thermore, it limits the security impact of some attacks that cannot be
prevented. We analyse our security architecure and show that it provides
the desired security aspects while still being a lightweight solution and
thus being applicable for self-organizing mobile wireless sensor networks.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks are increasingly showing viable solutions to many chal-
lenging problems that require the monitoring of real-world events and are pre-
dicted to affect our future daily lives in important ways [8]. Large numbers of
small, severely resource-constraint devices form these networks, by cooperating
to achieve a common goal, which would be unattainable for the individual nodes.
These networks are usually deployed in uncontrollable environments that
are not trustworthy. In addition to common threats in wireless networks, e.g.
information disclosure, message injection, and replay attacks, sensor networks
are physically accessible and consequently more vulnerable. An attacker may
capture and compromise a node and thus be able to control a valid member of
the network. Furthermore, a variety of Denial of Service attacks are possible in
sensor networks.
In this paper we present a security architecture for self-organizing mobile
wireless sensor networks that addresses most of the problems above. It utilizes
lightweight cryptographic algorithms that allow for easy authentication between
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the mobile sensor nodes and secure the communication inside the network. Fur-
thermore, it minimizes the effects of compromised sensor nodes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the beginning we set the
stage for our work by introducing a sensor network setting and its environment.
Furthermore, we provide a detailed threat analysis for this setting. Thereafter,
we describe the technical aspects of our security architecture and present some
implementation details. Subsequently, we provide an analysis of our security
architecture. A discussion of related as well as future work and a summary of
our contribution conclude the paper.
2 Sensor Network Architecture and Environment
In this section we want to introduce the sensor network characteristics on which
our security architecture is based. Three groups of aspects have a direct impact
on the design of our security architecture: the sensor nodes characteristics, the
network characteristics, and the environment.
2.1 Sensor Nodes
The sensor nodes are characterised as severely resource-constraint devices in
terms of available energy, memory, and computational power. For example, our
research node, the Embedded Sensor Board ESB 430/1, developed by the Freie
Universita¨t Berlin [19], is powered by three standard AAA batteries, incorporates
60 kbyte flash memory, 2 kbyte RAM, and 8 kbyte EEPROM, and uses the micro
controller MSP 430 from Texas Instruments. Furthermore, the sensor nodes are
not tamper-proof, due to cost factors and the general difficulty in building such
devices [1]. Consequently, it is possible to physically manipulate the devices if
captured. For interaction purposes, the nodes are equipped with radio frequency
communication capabilities. However, this wireless communication provides only
limited bandwidth.
These sensor node-specific factors set several constraints for the security
architecture. Since only a fraction of the total memory may be used by the
cryptographic algorithms and key material, the security architecture demands
very lightweight cryptographic algorithms with relatively short key sizes. Fur-
thermore, cryptographic computations need to be executable in an appropriate
amount of time as the execution of cryptographic algorithms is not the main
task of the nodes. Due to the limited bandwidth and communication being the
most expensive operation in terms of energy, messages should not be extended
significantly in length when applying security services.
2.2 Sensor Network
The sensor network consists of numerous mobile sensor nodes. It does not in-
corporate an infrastructure or any kind of hierarchy. In fact, the sensor nodes
are equal devices in terms of the role they can play in the network and should
self-organize to accomplish their appointed task, without any external guidance
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or supervision. Thus, the sensor nodes gather information based on their sensing
capabilities and make decisions based upon the gathered data. The communica-
tion paradigm is based on a distributed virtual shared information space (dvSIS)
combined with content-based forwarding of information as described in [6, 14].
The dvSIS describes the state of both the network and the environment. It is
based on the information that is acquired by the sensor nodes. Information ex-
change is based on one-hop communication, which eliminates the need for routing
mechanisms. Basically, all information is flooded inside the sensor network and
the nodes decide whether or not to forward the received information based on
filtering rules, e.g. the information being new or already known from their local
dvSIS. However, no device has complete knowledge (i.e. has all information in
its dvSIS) and must therefore rely on partial information. Nevertheless, employ-
ing these concepts, any node may become a gateway to an external network
or observer, which is preferable in mobile networks since the user might not
have control over the position of potential gateway-nodes. Another important
point in sensor networks is the limited lifetime of sensor data. Sensor data and
accordingly events that are derived from it should be communicated in realtime.
The network characteristics, similar to the node characteristics, determine
important aspects of the desired security architecture. Considering the node
mobility, authentication and key exchanges must not depend on numerous ex-
tra messages, since the topology is subject to frequent change. Additionally,
all necessary cryptographic functions and key material must reside and be exe-
cutable on the nodes. With respect to the realtime property of sensor networks,
cryptographic algorithms should also be as fast as possible. Finally, the security
architecture needs to be scalable to accommodate high numbers of mobile nodes.
2.3 Environment
The environment of these sensor networks depends on the assigned task and must
in most cases be seen as uncontrollable and not trustworthy. Even scenarios that
are characterised by a hostile environment can be envisioned.
This strongly emphasizes that a security architecture must be fault tolerant
and ensure certain levels of security even in the case of compromised nodes.
3 Threat Analysis
Any sound security architecture requires a thorough threat analysis beforehand
to enable an evaluation of its benefits. This section provides a detailed threat
analysis for the sensor network that was outlined above.
The commonly known two categories of active and passive attacks can also
be applied to sensor networks. However, sensor networks are susceptible to more
attacks than ordinary networks, as we will show in the following.
3.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks on the sensor network are relatively easy because of wireless com-
munication. The illegitimate disclosure of information, which breaks confiden-
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tiality, presents the major threat here. Therefore, information that is exchanged
between the nodes should be encrypted to ensure its confidentiality. Traffic anal-
ysis presents a minor threat to this kind of sensor networks since the sensor
nodes communicate frequently to publish their sensor readings, derived events,
or to coordinate their behaviour.
3.2 Active Attacks
Successful active attacks allow the attacker to seriously disrupt the functioning
of the network. Several points of attack are imaginable to influence the network
in its data capture and decisions. It must be ensured that it is impossible to
inject or replay messages into the network. Otherwise an attacker could mas-
querade as a legitimate member of the network and send its own information
or replay old data, which might lead to wrong decision making inside the net-
work. Another means of influencing the network originates from the way sensor
networks operate. If an attacker is able to generate physical stimuli he can in
parts specify what data the sensor nodes collect. The commonly known threat
of message modification, however, does not pose a threat to our sensor network.
Due to the local broadcast of the messages, it should be almost impossible to
intercept and modify a single message before any other node receives it.
A serious vulnerability arises from the physical accessibility of the sensor
nodes. Communicated location information might lead attackers to find out
about the positions of single nodes, which further emphasizes the need to keep
the communication between the nodes confidential. Furthermore, considering
that the sensor nodes are not tamper-proof, it is possible to physically com-
promise captured nodes. In particular, the attacker is likely to attain a node’s
cryptographic key material. If an attacker successfully compromises a node, he
gains full control about it and might use it to spy on the the rest of the sensor
nodes. He is now able to decipher any encrypted communication directed at that
particular node and to send legitimate custom messages.
Also several possibilities exist to start a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against
a sensor network [22]. For example, an attacker who is able to create physical
stimuli might flood the network or at least parts of it, so that real events drown
in the artificial noise of stimuli. Furthermore, attackers who possess the location
information of the nodes could capture or destroy the nodes one by one. The
traditionally known jamming of the wireless medium or sensor specific DoS-
attacks such as sleep deprivation torture [21] present threats as well.
4 Security Architecture
Generally, asymmetric as well as symmetric cryptography could be employed to
achieve security. However, an implementation [12] of an elliptic curve, one of
the fastest available asymmetric methods with an underlying field of about 2128
elements, shows, that it seems to be infeasible to implement a fast public key
system on the given nodes. The calculations would delay the message transmis-
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sion more than a second, which is unacceptable. Consequently we refrain from
using asymmetric cryptography.
Our security architecture is based on three different interacting phases: a pair-
wise key agreement to provide authentication and the initial key exchange, the
establishment of sending clusters to extend pairwise communication to broadcast
inside the communication range, and encrypted and authenticated communica-
tion of sensor data.
4.1 Pairwise Key Agreement
To achieve pairwise key agreement we use the Blundo-et-al.-scheme [5], which
is based on a predistribution scheme by Blom [4] and enables two nodes to
determine a pairwise secret that is solely shared among these two nodes. The
scheme is unconditionally secure and resistant against collusion of a maximum
of t users. In terms of a cooperative sensor network, this means that an attacker
has to compromise more than t nodes to compromise the whole network.
The scheme requires a certificate authority (CA) which randomly generates a
symmetric bivariate polynomial f(x, y) of degree t over an arbitrary finite field.
f(x, y) =
t∑
i,j=0
aijx
iyj (aij = aji)
The CA, ensuring that each sensor has an unique ID , evaluates the polyno-
mial in the following way:
gID(x) = f(x, ID).
Thus gID is a polynomial of degree t with a single variable x. The CA transfers
the individual key material (the coefficients of the polynomial gID) to the nodes
prior to the deployment of the sensor nodes.
Two nodes are able to determine their pairwise secret by evaluating their
private polynomial gID(x) where x denotes the other node’s identity. It can be
derived directly from the symmetry of the polynomial f(x, y) that both nodes
calculate the same value.
An efficient way to implement the Blundo-et-al.-scheme is presented in ap-
pendix A.
4.2 Sending Clusters
To communicate securely, every node establishes a randomly generated key
within its neighbourhood. This key is used solely by this node to encrypt and
authenticate its messages. If a node receives a message of which the content can-
not be decrypted and authenticated (i.e. it does not know the key) it calculates
the pairwise secret for the sender and itself using the Blundo-et-al.-scheme. This
secret is then used to transfer its own key secretly to the sender, which replies
by transferring its key. The node automatically sends its own key, because we
assume that if it could not decrypt and authenticate the other message, a change
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in the topology must have happened and the other node equally does not know
its sending key.
This protocol enables a node to establish its key in a new environment and
get to know the other nodes’ keys with just two messages (request and reply)
per neighbour. It is not restricted to an initialisation phase and can be used at
any time and with any other legitimate node of the network. Thus it supports
mobile sensor networks as well as the deployment of new nodes at a later point
of time.
4.3 Encrypted and Authenticated Communication
The sensor nodes always broadcast messages to their direct neighbourhood. For
encryption purposes the counter mode of operation [10] (see also figure 1) is
used, which allows an encryption of the message without changing its length. In
addition to the message itself the counter sj is added, which results in ordered
and unique messages. This overhead can be avoided if both sender and receiver
increment the counter after each transmission. However, due to the lossy nature
of the communication in sensor networks this procedure seems inappropriate.
A message loss by any of the neighbours would require two additional messages
(request of counter value and reply). Thus, the counter value is included in every
message. It is not necessary to use the full block size of an encryption algorithm
Fig. 1. Counter mode of operation. The counter register is divided into two parts:
s which is incremented once per message and t which is reset to zero for a new message
and incremented once per block
for the counter value, because any counter length can be padded with zeros.
Since the same counter should not be used twice, the size of the counter limits
the number of messages which can be encrypted by a single key.
Our security architecture can be implemented using any encryption algo-
rithm. Often the RC5 algorithm [18] is suggested as being a well suitable algo-
rithm for sensor networks. We give two reasons why this choice is not optimal
for our architecture. First, the key expansion step of the algorithm cannot be
integrated in the encryption process. This results in the need to have round keys
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stored for the whole encryption process which leads to a slightly higher memory
requirement than desired (at least 112 bytes for RC5-32/12/8 when the origi-
nal key needs to be kept). Second, the RC5 algorithm extensively uses circular
shifts. This operation is often not supported by low cost processors and must be
emulated by single step shifts, which leads to bad runtime behaviour.
For our existing implementation we examined the AES-final candidates. The
Rijndael algorithm [16] seems to offer the best performance, but requires large
lookup-tables. Also this algorithm is not constructed for a key length shorter than
128 bit, which are often used in sensor networks. Simply padding the key might
expose new flaws. Therefore, we decided to incorporate Serpent [2] which has
good runtime behaviour because it can be implemented using logical operations
only. These are much faster than circular shifts on low cost platforms. A reduction
of the number of rounds from 32 to 16 yields to linear speed-up while at the same
time not allowing any published attacks to be successful.
The encryption algorithm can be reused for the well-know CBC-MAC. The
result of the chain of encryption operations can be used to ensure the integrity
and the authentication of sensor data. Once again, there is no need to add the
complete output of the MAC-function as a checksum to the message, because 16
byte of overhead per message seems to be inappropriate for sensor networks.
5 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of our security architecture using the sensor nodes
ESB 430/1 [19]. The algorithms require 17,1 Kb. This results mainly from the
Serpent algorithm being a standard implementation, which has only been opti-
mized with regard to volatile memory usage and speed but not code size. During
run-time the algorithms need additional 86 bytes for their operations. The aver-
age delay caused by this is 30,9 ms per 16 byte of cleartext information.
The security degree t (number of nodes an attacker has to compromise to suc-
cessfully calculate the CA’s polynomial) is completely adjustable but influences
the run-time and memory requirement. For our 80-bit implementation (size of
the pairwise secrets) (t+1) · 10 bytes are required. The coefficients can be freely
distributed between volatile memory, code space and EEPROM wherever space
is available. For our testing, we chose the security degree to be 20 and stored
the coefficients in memory. Additionally, a node has to store the sending key of
each neighbour. In our implementation nodes store up to 20 sending keys. After
that they start to reuse the space by deleting the oldest one. In summary, we
use around a quarter of the available memory for our security architecture.
Also, for our prototype we used a 4 byte MAC and a 2 byte index which
merely results in an extension of the messages by 6 bytes.
6 Analysis
By employing our security architecture we are able to prevent most of the de-
picted threats while considering the constraints that the sensor network de-
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mands. It provides confidentiality as well as integrity for the communicated
information and ensures the authenticity of the sensor nodes. Furthermore, it
minimizes the effects of compromised nodes. All deployed cryptographic algo-
rithms are efficient in terms of run-time and memory usage and do not extend
the messages significantly.
Confidentiality is achieved by encrypting the messages. This prevents any
illegitimate disclosure of information. Futhermore, the CBC-MAC ensures the
integrity of the messages. We use short MACs in our architecture to reduce the
message overhead, which, on the one hand, enables the attacker to determine
legitimate messages by brute force. On the other hand, he has no control over the
message content due to the encryption of the message. Furthermore, the counter
mode of operation, which is used in the encryption process, automatically adds an
index to each message without adding overhead compared to simple encryption.
Hereby, replay attacks are prevented, because a receiver can keep track of already
used counter values, while the messages are only slightly extended.
Only legitimate nodes can join the communication, since no illegitimate node
is able to derive the sending key of the other nodes. An attacker may conduct
the pairwise key agreement protocol using a captured key request message from
another node. However, it is only possible for him to attack the encrypted send-
ing key (encrypted with the pairwise secret key), which, if no new ways to attack
Serpent become known, can be seen as impossible. Furthermore, the authentica-
tion process is implicitly included in the key exchange, which only requires two
additional messages.
One threat we cannot prevent is the possible capturing and compromising
of nodes. However, our security architecture minimizes its effects. While an at-
tacker, who successfully compromised a node, may be able to authenticate him-
self to the network and be able to join in the communication, he can only do so
using the one compromised node. The communication between non-compromised
nodes remains secure. This holds true for up to t compromised nodes, which is
based on the security specified by the initial symmetric bivariate polynomial
calculations. It is important to note that t is not neccessarily linearly dependent
on the actual network size. It denotes the number of nodes that need to be phys-
ically compromised, which is by far the most expensive attack in this scenario
and thus more unlikely than radio-based attacks.
Due to the fact that cryptographic algorithms cannot prevent DoS attacks,
the security architecture does not address these threats any further.
Our architecture is scalable and robust since all operations take place inside
a node’s communication radius. Thus, the actual size of the network does not
influence its local security associations.
7 Related Work
Security in sensor networks has been studied by several other researchers.
Perrig et al. developed the security architecture SPINS, which is based on the
two protocols SNEP, a protocol for data confidentiality, two-party data authen-
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tication, and data freshness and µTESLA, a broadcast authentication protocol
[17]. Their architecture relies on the concept, that every node shares a secret
key with a trusted base station, which is at all times able to communicate with
every node in the network.
Furthermore, several key management schemes have been put forward for
sensor networks: Basagni et al. proposed a solution to periodically update a
symmetric key which is shared by all nodes in the network [3]. Their solution is
based on the assumption that all nodes are constructed tamper-proof, which is
not always the case [1]. Carman et al. studied several key management protocols
in sensor networks with respect to performance on different hardware platforms
[7]. Zhu et al. proposed the Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol
(LEAP) [24] which utilizes four types of keys for each node. These are used for
different purposes and range from the individual key that is shared with the
base station, up to a group key that is shared with all nodes in the network. Es-
chenauer and Gligor presented a pool-based random key predistribution system
[11], which Chan et al. extended by presenting three new mechanisms for key
establishment [9].
The key setup algorithm that is most related to ours is presented by Liu and
Ning [15]. They proposed a combination of the Blundo-et-al.-scheme and the
pool-based random key predistribution system by Eschenauer and Gligor [11].
With the same storage requirements, the CA uses shorter polynomials than the
non-modified Blundo-et-al.-scheme but deploys more than one private polyno-
mial from a pool to a single node. If two nodes share at least one polynomial
from the same scheme, they use this to determine the pairwise secret as described
in section 4.1. The combination has a higher resistance against the possibility
of compromising nodes than the Blundo-et-al.-scheme if the compromised nodes
are picked randomly, with the disadvantage that only certain nodes are able to
communicate. Lui and Ning state that this can be amended by using an interme-
diate node to establish a connection between two nodes which have no scheme in
common. We think this enables new attacks in mobile sensor networks. A single
compromised node is able to vouch for other nodes the attacker has fabricated
and allows them to become part of the sensor network.
Furthermore, the system is only advantageous if an attacker is not able to
determine the identity of the polynomials stored on a certain node. Therefore,
in [11] a protocol is proposed where an encrypted list, using the pairwise keys
for the encryption, is exchanged. Adding to the disadvantage that this requires
an additional message exchange of at least 32 byte length (64-bit-block cipher
and 4 polynomials per node), the system is still not secure against compromising
nodes. If an attacker has compromised at least a single node, he can actively use
it to communicate with others to determine whether they share any polynomial.
With this method, the attacker is able to actively attack nodes that possess
certain polynomials. Due to the longer messages and the described attacks, we
decided to use the unmodified Blundo-et-al.-scheme.
Wood and Stankovic identified several DoS attacks in sensor networks [22]
and presented a protocol, which allows to map regions that are subject to DoS
by radio jamming [23].
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8 Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a security architecture that provides confiden-
tiality, integrity, and authentication for a mobile wireless sensor network. For
this purpose, we have presented algorithms to easily set up pairwise secret keys
between the mobile sensor nodes and to establish a sending cluster per node, in
which it can communicate its messages securely. Furthermore, our solution mini-
mizes the effects of compromised nodes. Compromising an adjustable number of
sensor nodes does not compromise the whole security architecture but restricts
the security breach to the immediate neigbourhood of the compromised node.
Finally, we have implemented a prototype of our security architecture, which
clearly shows that it is a lightweight solution and applicable for self-organizing
mobile wireless sensor networks.
Several directions for future research arise from our solution. First, we intend
to simulate our approach, using NS-2, in order to determine the maximum grade
of node-mobility our security architecture is able to cope with. Second, we would
like to integrate the ability to identify compromised nodes and methods to ex-
clude them from the network. Another interesting question is to determine how
much further we can optimize the employed algorithms with respect to memory
usage and speed.
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A Implementation Details
This part illustrates a way to efficiently implement the Blundo-et-al.-scheme.
Two concepts are combined: first, the Horner Rule minimizes the multiplication
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effort and second, the choice of the field determines the speed of the modular
reduction.
For an efficient implementation the ID’s can be reduced to a certain range,
e.g. 0 < ID < 216. If the evaluation is done using the Horner Rule (e.g. [13], see
also figure 2) only multiplications between a short ID and a longer field element
have to be done, which allows for a much faster modular arithmetic than the
general case.
anID
n + an−1ID
n−1 + . . . + a0 =
(. . . (anID + an−1)ID + an−2)ID + . . .) + a0
Fig. 2. Horner Rule
The choice of the field F determines the range and the speed of the evalu-
ation of the common secret. The scheme can be implemented using any field.
Consequently, a field, which suits the existing hardware platform well, should be
chosen. The arithmetic of GF (p) is supported by the existing hardware multiplier
of the MSP430 processor. Therefore, this choice is faster than an implementation
using GF (2m).
The following example assumes that the identities are limited to 0 < ID < 216
and illustrates the usage of a 80-bit Generalized Mersenne Prime, which allows
for an efficient modular arithmetic [20], p = 280 − 264 − 232 − 1. First a normal
multiplication of a 16-bit identity and a 80-bit coefficient is calculated. After-
wards one can rearrange the 96-bit result r =
∑
5
i=0 ri2
16i to s =
∑
4
i=0 ri2
16i and
t = 264r5 + 2
32r5 + r5. From the special form of p follows that s + t = r mod p.
The advantage is that the reduction modulo p can be calculated by a single 80-
bit addition and at most 2 80-bit subtractions. This is substantially faster than
any standard method that assumes two equally long operands.
